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ABSTRACT
To provide convincing recommendations, which can be fully
understood and accepted by a decision-maker, a decision-
aider must often engage in an interaction and take the deci-
sion maker’s responses into account. This feedback can lead
to revising the model used to represent the preferences of
the decision-maker. Our objective in this paper is to equip
an artificial decision-aider with this adaptive behavior. To
do that, we build on decision theory to propose a principled
way to select decision models.
Our approach is axiomatic in that it does not only work
for a predefined subset of methods—we instead provide the
properties that make models compatible with our proposal.
Finally, the interaction model is complex since it can involve
the exchange of different types of preferential information, as
well as others locutions such as justifications. We manage it
through a dialogue game, and prove that it satisfies desired
properties, in particular termination, and efficiency
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial In-
telligence—Coherence and coordination, intelligent agents,
Multiagent systems
Keywords
Recommender system; Communication protocol; Argumen-
tation
1. INTRODUCTION
In a decision aiding context, there are at least two distinct
actors: a decision maker (DM), and an analyst, that we call
a decision aider (DA). These play very different roles [24].
The DM explains the decision problem to the DA, has some
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preferences on the decision options and is at the end respon-
sible for the decision and its justifcation. The DA helps
him in this task by bringing some methodology and ratio-
nality. The DA analyses the consistency of the information
provided by the DM, proposes some recommendation on the
basis of such information and constructs the corresponding
justifications. A key ingredient of the decision process is how
interaction takes place. In particular, the DA should be able
to adapt itself to the responses of the DM. In fact, the DM’s
preferences are often incomplete, or at least not fixed at
the beginning of the process. Only when confronted with
the recommendation can the DM react and give feedback.
The competence of a human DA is precisely to integrate this
new information, to revise her representation of the profile of
the DM, so as to produce a finely adapted recommendation
which can be understood and accepted.
This raises a challenging issue when the DA is an artifi-
cial agent, since it must have precisely this ability to adapt
itself to the responses of the DM. Take for instance recom-
mender systems used in commercial websites: the role of
the DA is to recommend items that the DM is likely to buy
(travel, books, etc.). Often the product space is extremely
large, and the role of the DA is to help to navigate in this
catalogue. According to [14], “user feedback is a vital com-
ponent of most recommenders”. In recommender systems,
this feedback of the DM can take various forms: value-based
feedback which asserts a value on a given attribute (“I want
three gears on my bike”), preference-based feedback which
singles out a favorite item so as to get more of the same
type in the next cycle of recommendation (“This is the bike
I prefer, can you show more like this?”), or critique-based
feedback, which can be seen as a mixture of the two since
the DM picks a preferred item but at the same expresses how
it could be improved (“This type of bike, but in a different
color.”). Many recommender systems do not explicitly con-
struct a preference model, and thus have no memory of user
feedback. The system can then recommend an option which
the user crticised a few iterations before. To take proper
account of user feedback in timely and consistent manner,
some authors argue to maintain the user’s preference model
[5, 19, 25]. Model-based recommendation systems are then
based on a unique model (e.g. additive utility) and rely upon
the assumption that all potential users can be represented
by this model [4, 25]. However, in the case of multi-criteria
recommendation, there is a wide variety of possible pref-
erence models, and assuming a fixed model may prove to
be too restrictive. Suppose for instance that the DA starts
with a majority model, but later realizes that the user shall
be represented by quantitative utilities and thus switches to
additive utility model.
In this paper we consider a simple recommendation sce-
nario where a set of available options is known at the start.
To remedy a previous flaw, here we propose to allow an
artificial DA to use a variety of decision models (able to
encompass most of decision situations) to build its recom-
mendation (as opposed to adjusting the parameters of a sin-
gle model). This raises some obvious questions: (i) if the
DA can choose among several models, is there a principled
way to do so? (ii) would such a method be dependent of
the models considered? And, finally (iii) how, in practice,
should such an interaction be regulated?
We borrow from decision theory and Multiple Criteria De-
cision Analysis to answer the first point in the positive. Re-
garding (ii), we advocate a generic method to account for
this adaptative behavior. Indeed, instead of focusing on a
given collection of models, we adopt an axiomatic approach,
and thus characterize which models can be handled in the
way we propose. As for (iii), the actual procedure we put
forward takes the form of a dialogue game between the DM
and the DA, and is inspired by recent work in dialectical
models of interaction.
2. A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We give a basic dialogue example between a DA and a
DM for a given decision problem. It shows the asymmetry
between the two agents: on the one hand the different feed-
back expressed by the DM (asking explanations, suggesting
new propositions, etc.), and on the other hand how the DA
adapts its responses (providing justifications, changing or
correcting the recommendation, etc.).
Example 1. Suppose that a DM specifies that he has to
rank four options {a, b, c, d} (say, bikes to be deployed for
sharing in big city). Each bike is evaluated on the set {c1, c2,
c3, c4, c5} of criteria (say, price, weight, esthetic, gears, di-
mension). The comparison of the options over each criteria
(where x ci y means that option x is strictly preferred to y
on criterion ci) is as follows:
c1: d c1 a c1 c c1 b;
c2: d c2 a c2 b c2 c;
c3: b c3 c c3 a c3 d;
c4: c c4 b c4 a c4 d;
c5: b c5 a c5 c c5 d.
On the basis of this information, the DA computes a rec-
ommendation and submits it to the DM for a discussion.
Such a discussion unfolds as follows:
(1) DA: I recommend that b  a  c  d.
(2) DM: Why b  a?
(3) DA: b is better on a majority of criteria (c3, c4, c5).
(4) DM: I see, but still I would prefer a to b
(5) DA: Why?
(6) DM: Because a is better on the price and weight (c1, c2),
these are very important criteria.
(7) DA: Fine. I still recommend b over c.
(8) DM: Yes, I agree.
(9) DA: Now, would d be preferred to a?
(10) DM: No, this is not the case.
(11) DA: Why?
(12) DM: Because d is bad on esthetic, gears and dimension
(c3, c4, c5).
(13) DA: Ok, so c is better than d.
(14) DM: I agree.
(15) DA: Do you agree also that a is preferred to b?
(16) DM: Of course.
(17) DA: Ok. My recommendation is thus: a  b  c  d.
3. BASIC DEFINITIONS
We consider a finite set O of options, a finite set H of
criteria. The recommendations of the DA are based on a
decision model, which provides a total order of the elements
of O on the basis of their evaluations on the criteria. There
are many different decision models in the literature. Each
model corresponds to different rationality assumptions on
the DM. Since neither DA nor DM know in advance what
model best represents the DM, one cannot use a single pre-
defined decision model. Rather we use a family Π of decision
models that encompasses most commonly encountered DM
profiles. In order to support our running example, we con-
sider four decision models (described formally below), but
our approach is not restricted to these models.
Example 2. In the rest of the paper, for illustration, we
will consider the following family Π of models: Simple Ma-
jority model (noted piSM ), Simple Weighted Majority model
(piSWM ), Mean model (piM ) and Weighted Sum model (piWS ).
3.1 Description of the preference information
In order to make a decision between several options, the
DM needs to provide information about the evaluation of
an option x ∈ O, and about the relative strength of criteria.
We will make use of two evaluation scales:
• an evaluation scale for the options on the criteria SO,
e.g. SO = { good, average, bad};
• an evaluation scale for the importance of criteria SH ,
e.g. SH = { strong, average, weak}.
The DM expresses some preference information (PI) which
is related to the comparison of the options on the criteria,
or the importance of criteria. This PI allows to construct
a preference relation among the options, thanks to the use
of a model in Π. The PI is expressed by means of different
types of statements:
Def. 1. An evaluation statement is of the form [c : x =
α] where x ∈ O, c ∈ H and α ∈ SO, meaning that the
assessment of option x on criterion c is equal to α.
Def. 2. A preference statement is of the form [x c y]
where x, y ∈ O and c ∈ H, meaning that x is preferred to y
on criterion c.
Def. 3. A weight statement is of the form [c = α] where
c ∈ H and α ∈ SH , meaning that the importance of the
criterion c is equal to α.
Example 3. (Ex. 1, cont.) We have many preference
statements of the form [d c1 a]. In Turn 12, the DM uses
an evaluation statement: [c4 : d = bad], while in Turn 6, the
DM uses a weight statement: [c1 = strong], [c2 = strong].
In order to make inferences from PI, this latter shall be
consistent. This concept is now defined.
Def. 4. The previous statements are called PI statements.
A subset P of PI statements is said to be consistent if there
is no two evaluation statements [c : x = α], [c : x = α′] with
α 6= α′, there is no cycle of c for preference statements,
and there is no two weight statements [c = α], [c = α′] with
α 6= α′.
Clearly, the use of some type of statements says something
about the underlying preference model. Let P(pi), with pi ∈
Π, denote the set of such statements that can be used for
constructing model pi (see Ex. 4 below), and P = ∪pi∈ΠP(pi).
Thus we have:
Def. 5. The Preference Information (PI) is any subset
of P. The Preference Information (PI) for a decision model
pi ∈ Π is any subset P ⊆ P(pi).
The value of P(pi) for the different models is now shown
in the four models.
Example 4. (Ex. 2 Cont.)
• the model piSM relies only on the preference statements:
P(piSM ) = {[a c b] , a, b ∈ O , c ∈ H}, as it counts
pros and cons criteria.
• In piSWM , criteria are not anonymous. Hence weight
statements are also needed: P(piSWM ) = P(piSM ) ∪
{[c = α] , c ∈ H,α ∈ SH}.
• In piM , criteria are anonymous but evaluation state-
ments are needed: P(piM ) = P(piSM )∪{[c : x = α] , x ∈
O, c ∈ H,α ∈ SO}.
• In piWS , criteria are not anonymous: P(piWS ) = P(piM )∪
{[c = α] , c ∈ H,α ∈ SH}.
A decision model pi ∈ Π produces a preference relation
pi,P (assumed to be a total order) over the options, given
P ⊆ P(pi). When P is inconsistent (see Def. 4), pi,P
is empty. Moreover, often, P is incomplete, since the DM
may not have the ability/time to fully specify the problem.
When this is the case, we can use default weights and scores
to handle incomplete preference statements (see Ex. 5) ,
hence the preference order is always complete.
Example 5. (Ex. 4 Cont.) The preference relation de-
rived for the four models piSM , piSWM , piM and piWS can be
put in a unified way. For pi ∈ Π and P ∈ P(pi) (consistent
and possibly incomplete),
a pi,P b ⇔ Fpi,P (a, b) > Fpi,P (b, a)
where
FpiSM ,P (a, b) = |{c ∈ H, [a c b] ∈ P}|
FpiSWM ,P (a, b) =
∑
c∈H, [acb]∈P
αPc
FpiM ,P (a, b) =
∑
c∈H
uc(a)
FpiWS ,P (a, b) =
∑
c∈H
αPc uc(a)
with
αPc =
{
α if ∃α ∈ SH s.t. [c = α] ∈ P
“average ′′ otherwise
(In other words, missing preference information in P re-
garding weights of criteria is filled by [c = average] (neu-
tral). We assign the numerical weights 1
2
, 1 and 2 to “weak ′′,
“average ′′ and “strong ′′ respectively), and
uc(a) =
∑
d∈O\{a}
∆Pc (a, d)
∆Pc (a, d) =
 +3 if [a c d] ∈ P and [c : d = bad ] ∈ P+1 if [a c d] ∈ P and [c : d = bad ] 6∈ P0 otherwise
(Missing preference information in P regarding the evalua-
tion of the options on the criteria is filled by the default +1
value. We shall not discuss here how figures +1,+3 are ob-
tained – see elicitation of intensities of preference, e.g. [6]).
Note that utility uc is computed from differences of intensity
of preferences.
The goal of a decision problem, noted G, can be either a
ranking (from the best option to the worst, as in Ex. 1), or
a selection of the best option (which is guaranteed to exist
since the preference relation is complete). Thus a recom-
mendation is an answer to a given problem G.
Def. 6. A comparison statement is of the form [x  y]
where x, y ∈ O, meaning that x is globally preferred to y.
Def. 7. Two subsets φ1, φ2 of comparison statements are
conflicting if there exists [x  y] ∈ φ1 s.t. [y  x] ∈ φ2.
Def. 8. If the goal G of the decision problem is a ranking,
a recommendation ψ is a subset of comparison statements
[a  b] which corresponds to a total order over O. If G is the
selection of the best option, a recommendation ψ is a subset
of comparison statements of the form {[a  b] for all b ∈
O \ a} for some a ∈ O.
Def. 9. For P ⊆ P(Π) and a subset ψ of preference
statements, we define the entailment |=pi w.r.t. pi ∈ Π by
P |=pi {[a1  b1], . . . , [aq  bq]} if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , q} [ai pi,P
bi].
In words, under the decision model pi, the consistent pref-
erential information P supports the comparison statements
[a1  b1], . . . , [aq  bq].
Example 6 (Ex. 1 cont.). For P = {[d c1 b], [b c2
d], [d c3 b]}, we have P |=piSM [d  b] as d piSM ,P b.
3.2 Description of the decision models
In order to adapt to different DMs, the DA will use a
range of decision models Π, where each model is identified
by a set of properties. Such properties correspond to some
characteristics of the DM’s preferences, corresponding to a
set of conditions supporting the use of a given model.
We denote by Q the set of properties that will allow to
discriminate among the set of models we consider. For a
given model pi ∈ Π, each property can be either satisfied
or not. For illustration we will consider the set of prop-
erties Q that include: (1) Cardinality of the model (car):
piWS (>,>)
piM (>,⊥)piSWM (⊥,>)
piSM (⊥,⊥)
Figure 1: Example of Decision Models
it means that the specific difference of performance values
makes sense (when this property is not satisfied, only the
ordering of options is relevant for comparison). (2) Non-
Anonymity of the model (nan): it suggests that criteria are
not exchangeable (when this property is not satisfied, all
criteria are exchangeable). With Q = {car ,nan}, we can
describe the four decision models piSM , piSWM , piM , piWS .
Example 7. (Ex.2 Cont.) Figure 1 summarizes such mod-
els and their description according to the two properties. For
instance, piSWM is represented by vector (⊥,>): the second
property (nan) is satisfied (because the weights depend on
the criteria), but not the first property (car) as the decision
rule does not require cardinality.
We note that the properties are not supposed to charac-
terize each model (in the sense of axiomatic approaches).
For instance, in [13], simple majority is characterized by
anonymity, neutrality and monotony. However, in our case,
neutrality and monotony are useless to discriminate among
the four models 1. Finally, properties are indeed basically
logically independent. However there can be dependencies
among them, thereby implying that some combinations of
properties is not possible (see Ex. 8).
Notation 1. For pi ∈ Π, let Qpi ⊆ Q be the set of prop-
erties that decision model pi satisfies.
For instance, QpiSM = ∅ and QpiWS = {car ,nan}. Set Q =
{Qpi , pi ∈ Π}. In our example, Q = 2Q. But in general,
not all subsets of Q correspond to a model. In this case,
Q is assumed to satisfy the following conditions: (i) ∅ ∈ Q,
there always exists a model fulfilling no property; (ii) if R ∈
Q \ {Q}, then ∃i ∈ R s.t. R \ {i} ∈ Q; (iii) If R,R′ ∈ Q,
then R ∩ R′ ∈ Q. Let us illustrate these properties on a
more general situation than Ex. 7.
Example 8. On top of the two properties Cardinality (car)
and Non-Anonymity (nan), let us introduce a veto property
(vet) saying that there is a veto criterion. One can readily
see that not all combinations of properties yield to a relevant
decision model. Figure 2 shows the set of relevant properties.
For instance, the “outranking model” [22] (noted piOR) cor-
responds to property vector (⊥,>,>): it is ordinal but uses
criteria weights and veto criteria. On the other hand, prop-
erty vector (⊥,⊥,>) has no relevant corresponding model as
it satisfies only veto. A similar situation arises for (>,⊥,>)
and (>,>,>) as a cardinal model (weighted sum) able to rep-
resent a veto criterion subsumes to a dictatorial rule (only
1Of course, it is always possible to consider more properties
in order to describer other types of decision models (inter-
action among criteria (ruling out additive models), or con-
ditional preferences (leading to CP nets), etc.)
piOR (⊥,>,>) piWS (>,>,⊥)
piM (>,⊥,⊥)piSWM (⊥,>,⊥)
piSM (⊥,⊥,⊥)
Figure 2: Structure Q with three properties
one criterion counts), which is not very interesting and can
be represented by piOR. Clearly, the three conditions (i), (ii)
and (iii) are satisfied in this example.
Set Q is used to guide the navigation among the different
models (or associated subsets of properties), depending on
the properties that are currently satisfied or contradicted.
From (ii), if we take a set R of properties satisfied by a
model, then we can remove a property that yields to another
set of properties satisfied by a model. By (iii), there exists
a model which fulfills only the properties in common of any
pair of models. Remark that the second and third property
is satisfied by antimatroids and lattices [7], respectively.
3.3 Identifying the decision model of the DA
The DA collects some PI statements P from the DM and
then will make inferences. First of all, the DA needs to
identify the decision model to use. In fact, given preference
statement P , the least specific model (see Def. 10) compati-
ble within P is used by the DA to make assertion, question,
challenge, argue in the dialogue (see Axiom 2 in Section 4.3).
Let Π(P ) := {pi ∈ Π , P ⊆ P(pi)} be the set of models
compatible with P . In general, several decision models are
possible (see example below).
Example 9. (Ex7 Cont.) For our example, if P = {[c2 =
very strong ], [a c2 c], [c c2 b]}, then Π(P ) = {piWSM , piWS}
as P ⊆ P(piSWM ), P ⊆ P(piWS ).
In order to identify the model to use, we introduce the speci-
ficity of a model. As the elements in Q are basic properties
that shall be satisfied by default, the least specific model is
the one that satisfies more properties.
Def. 10. A model pi is less specific than pi′ if Qpi ⊆ Qpi′ .
Def. 11. Let pi[P ] be the least specific model in Π(P ).
This is the model used by the DA given P .
In Example 9, pi[P ] is piWSM since it satisfies less properties
than piWS asQpiWSM = {nan} andQpiWS = {car ,nan}. More
generally, the least specific model is obtained as follows.
Example 10. Given some information P , we can distin-
guish four cases, summarized in Table 1.
Intuitively, the notion of specificity also concerns the PI
statements that can be used with a model. If decision model
pi is less specific than pi′, then pi shall use less PI statements,
and thus P(pi) ⊆ P(pi′). We strengthen this condition into
the following axiom:
Axiom 1. Relation Among Models (RAM). Consider three
models pi1, pi2, pi12 such that R12 = R1 ∩ R2 where R1 =
Qpi1 , R2 = Qpi2 , R12 = Qpi12 . Then P(pi12) = P(pi1)∩P(pi2).
Table 1: Compatible models and least specific model
for each type of PI statements.
Form of the statements con-
tained in P
Compatible
models
Least
specific
model
[a c b] Π piSM
[c : x = α] piM , piWS piM
and possibly [a c b]
[c = wc] and possibly [a c b] piSWM , piWS piSWM
[c : x = α] and [c = wc], piWS piWS
and possibly [a c b], [a ∼c b]
It is easy to see that RAM is satisfied in our running ex-
ample (Ex. 4).Note that if R1, R2 ∈ Q then R1 ∩ R2 ∈ Q
by condition (iii). This axiom is satisfied in our running
example (from Ex. 7 and Figure 1). For instance, with
pi1 = piSWM , pi2 = piM , we have pi12 = piSM , QpiSM = QpiSWM ∩
QpiM = ∅ and P(piSM ) = P(piSWM ) ∩ P(piM ).
Thanks to RAM, Definition 11 is well-defined:
Lemma 1. Under RAM, for any subset P is PI state-
ments, there exists a unique least specific element in Π(P ).
Lemma 2. For two subsets P, P ′ of PI statements, if P ⊆
P ′ then pi[P ] is less specific than pi[P ′].
Proofs are omitted due to space limitations.
4. A FORMAL DIALOGUE MODEL
We have already introduced the two players in the dia-
logue. The DA has the aim of constructing a solution to a
given decision problem. The DM expresses his preferences
through feedback and has to be convinced by the solution.
Moreover, during the dialogue, the DA constructs a Knowl-
edge Base composed of two parts : KBP ⊆ P containing
the Preference Information provided by the DM, and KBφ
containing the accepted comparison statements.
Example 11. At the beginning, KBP contains all prefer-
ence statements [x ci y]. In turn 6, [c2 = very strong ] is
added to KBP . In turn 8, [b  c] is added to KBφ
4.1 Dialogue statements and locutions
We define the dialogue statements (Φ) that we need in
order to express the different types of information.
Def. 12. The dialogue statements (Φ) are composed of
all comparison statements (see Def. 6) and all preference
information (PI) (see Def. 5).
The different locutions used in our dialogue game are in-
tuitively described below, assuming φ ∈ Φ:
• Assert(φ). It makes possible to put a claim forward.
• Accept(φ). Used to accept (possibly partially) a claim.
• Challenge(φ). The challenge requests some state-
ment that can serve as a basis for justifying or ex-
plaining φ.
• Question(φ). A question can be used to ask the DM
to respond on statement already asserted by the DA.
(for instance is it the case that φ is true?).
• Argue(φ, p) (with p ⊆ P): p is an explanation of
φ. The link between p and φ is set unspecified for the
DM, as he does not use in general a model.
• Contradict(φ) to contradict a previous statement φ.
• Succeed(φ) (such that φ is the final recommenda-
tion): the DA identifies that it has succeeded in pro-
viding a convincing recommendation to the DM.
• Fail: the DA acknowledges that it has failed to find a
convincing solution to the DM’s problem.
4.2 Commitment rules
To capture dialogues between agents, we follow [12, 18]
in associating a commitment store (CS) with the DM and
the DA, which holds the statements and the arguments to
which a particular they are dialectically committed.
It is however important to stress that the two behave dif-
ferently: while the DM’s one is monotonic, the DA’s one
can be revised throughout the process. Let φ ∈ Φ. In the
following table, s stands for the speaker (dm for the DM
or da for the DA). The CS is left unchanged with locution
Challenge.
Assert(φ) CS(s) = CS(s) ∪ {φ}
Accept(φ) CS(s) = CS(s) ∪ {φ}
Contradict(φ) CS(s) = CS(s) ∪ {¬φ}
Argue(φ, p) CS(s) = CS(s) ∪ {φ, p}
Note that the locutions Fail and Succeed mark the end
of the dialogue and so will not lead to the updating of the
commitment store.
4.3 Dialogue rules
The protocol for our dialogue model is described in Figure
3. Each node in this graph is a locution, except for “Update”
(described in detail later), and the outgoing arcs from a node
indicate the possible following locutions. A dialogue under
this protocol is composed of several iterations. Each itera-
tion starts from node “update”, and is organized around an
assert(ion) or a question made by the DA, and the feedback
of the DM.
In Fig. 3, φ1, φ2, . . . , φ8 are non empty comparison state-
ments, and p5, p7 ⊆ P. On top of the previous constraints
among locutions, the relevance [17] of the content (dialogue
statements) of the moves is constrained (otherwise, the di-
alogue could easily become meaningless), and the relations
among the statements used in successive locutions are spec-
ified in the table included in Fig. 3.
For instance, we have φ3 ⊆ φ1 as the DM can challenge
only a subpart of what was asserted by the DA.
For the DA, we note that p5 is formally an explanation of
φ5 (i.e. p5 |=pi[KBP ] φ5). Lastly, we assume that the DM is
sure about his preferences and the dialogue will not modify
them (they will neither be contradicted nor changed) . This
corresponds to the prescriptive approach of decision aiding
[24]. The aim of the dialogue is to propose a recommen-
dation and a justification to the DM. However, if the DM
changes his preferences, the main impact is that statements
put in KBP or KBφ can become wrong later and shall then
be revised or removed. Thus when inconsistency arises, the
DA may challenge statements in KBP or KBφ. But, it is
outside the scope of this paper to consider this, hence we
assume that the dialogue cannot backtrack.
update
Fail
Succeed(φ0)
Assert(φ1)Question(φ2) Argue(φ5, p5)
Challenge(φ6)
Accept(φ8)
Challenge(φ3) Contradict(φ4)
Argue(φ7, p7)
φ3 ⊆ φ1, φ3 ⊆ φ2
φ4 ⊆ φ1, φ4 ⊆ φ2, φ4 ⊆ φ5
φ5 ⊆ φ3
φ6 ⊆ φ4
φ7 ⊆ φ6, φ7 ⊆ φ5 or φ7 conflicting with φ5
φ8 ⊆ φ1, φ8 ⊆ φ2, φ8 ⊆ φ5
Figure 3: Successive speech acts at each iteration (grey nodes are for the DM, white nodes for the DA).
The update step.
Node “Update” does not correspond to a speech act. It
enables the DA to analyse the exchanges made during last
iteration of the dialogue, update the knowledge base and
construct the proposal for the next iteration. This is formal-
ized in Axiom UN. More precisely, such an axiom presents
all cases that can occur in the update node (see Ex 12).
We make several design assumptions. First, we assume
that the DA and the DM can use the same statement several
times (to allow the DA to update KBP ,KBφ and repropose
the same statement. This is for instance the case if the
DM agrees with φ1, φ2 or φ5 but not with the argument
used). However, the DA is only allowed to propose the same
statement more than once if new preference information has
been suggested by the DM. Otherwise repetition leads to the
protocol ending with a Fail (case (a) below).
Axiom 2 (Update Node (UN)). At and after node “Up-
date”, the DA behaves as follows:
(a) If CS(dm) ⊆ KBP ∪ KBφ ∪ CS(da), then the DA ut-
ters Fail (the DM does not accept new parts of the
recommendation, nor does he provide new preferential
information. He is not convinced by the arguments of
the DA, then the DM and the DA come up with differ-
ent conclusions with the same preference statements.
Hence they cannot agree.);
(b) CS(dm) ∩ P is added to KBP . If KBP is inconsistent
(Def. 4), the DA makes the speech act Fail (the in-
formation provided by the DM is inconsistent wrt the
family of models that the DA can handle.);
(c) One identifies the least specific compatible decision model
pi[KBP ] (see Def. 11). For every φ ∈ CS(dm), if KBP
|=pi[KBP ] φ, then φ is added to KBφ;
(d) The recommendation for goal G at current iteration is
noted φc (uniquely defined by Def. 8 and relation KBP
|=pi[KBP ] φc). Then the missing commitments for φc
are:
miss(φc) = φc \ KBφ (1)
If miss(φc) = ∅ the DA utters Succeed(φc);
(e) If ∃φ ∈ CS(dm) which contradicts φc, then the DA
makes the speech act Assert(¬φ),
(f) Otherwise: if the current recommendation φc has not
been modified in the update phase, then the DA utters
Question(φ1) with φ1 ⊆ miss(φc), or else the DA
utters Assert(φ2), with φ2 ⊆ miss(φc).
Note that this implies that at the first iteration of the pro-
tocol, the DA makes the speech act Assert(φ) with φ ⊆ φc.
From UN, the model used by the DM is pi[KBP ] and thus
the properties that are inferred are Qpi[KBP ].
Example 12. (Ex.1 Cont.) In the following we present
the different turns of the dialogue. The goal G is a rank-
ing. Superscript “(k)” represents the value at iteration k (for
instance, KB(2)P is the value of KBP at iteration 2). More-
over, when we use the locution statements, we use the labels
φ0, . . . φ8, as in Figure 3, to help the reader to follow the
path in the dialogue.
1st iteration – update: KB(1)P contains all statements [x ci
y], KB(1)φ = ∅, pi[KB(1)P ] = piSM , φ(1)c = [b  a  c  d],
miss(φ
(1)
c ) = φ
(1)
c
(1) DA:Assert(φ
(1)
1 ), φ
(1)
1 = φ
(1)
c
(2) DM:Challenge(φ
(1)
3 ), φ
(1)
3 = {[b  a]}
(3) DA:Argue(φ
(1)
5 , p
(1)
5 ), φ
(1)
5 = {[b  a]}, p(1)5 = {[b c3
a], [b c4 a], [b c5 a]}
(4) DM:Contradict(φ
(1)
4 ), φ
(1)
4 = {[a  b]}
(5) DA:Challenge(φ
(1)
6 ), φ
(1)
6 = {[a  b]}
(6) DM:Argue(φ
(1)
7 , p
(1)
7 ), φ
(1)
7 = {[a  b]}, p(1)7 = {[a c1
b], [a c2 b], [c1 = strong ], [c2 = strong ]}
2nd iteration – update: KB(2)P = KB(1)P ∪{[c1 = strong ], [c2 =
strong ]}; KB(2)φ = ∅, pi[KB(2)P ] = piWSM , φ(2)c = [d  a 
b  c]2, miss(φ(2)c ) = φ(2)c
(7) DA:Assert(φ
(2)
1 ), φ
(2)
1 = {[b  c]}
(8) DM:Accept(φ
(2)
1 ), φ
(2)
1 = {[b  c]}: CS(2)(dm) = {[b 
c]}
3rd iteration – update: KB(3)P = KB(2)P ; KB(3)φ = {[b 
c]}, pi[KB(3)P ] = piWSM , φ(3)c = [d  a  b  c], miss(φ(3)c ) =
{[d  a  b]}
(9) DM:Question(φ
(3)
2 ), φ
(3)
2 = {[d  a]}
(10) DA:Contradict(φ
(3)
4 ), φ
(3)
4 = {[a  d]}
2In particular d 
piWSM ,KB(2)P
a as αc1 = αc2 = 2 and αc3 =
αc4 = αc5 = 1.
(11) DM:Challenge(φ
(3)
6 ), φ
(3)
6 = {[a  d]}
(12) DA:Argue(φ
(3)
7 , p
(3)
7 ), φ
(3)
7 = {[a  d]}, p(3)7 = {[a c3
d], [a c4 d], [a c5 d], [c3 : d = bad], [c4 : d = bad], [c5 : d =
bad]}
4rd iteration – update: KB(4)P = KB(2)P ∪ {[c4 : d = bad]};
KB(4)φ = {[b  c]}, pi[KB(4)P ] = piWS, φ(4)c = [a  b  c  d],
miss(φ
(4)
c ) = {[a  b], [c  d]}
Let us explain why c  d. For the computation of ∆c, we
have for instance ∆P2 (d, c) = 1 and ∆
P
3 (c, d) = 3. Hence
u1(c) = ∆1(c, a) + ∆1(c, b) + ∆1(c, d) = 1, u2(c) = 0,
u3(c) = 4, u4(c) = 5, u5(c) = 3, and u1(d) = 3, u2(d) = 3,
u3(d) = 0, u4(d) = 0, u5(d) = 0. Moreover, FpiWS ,P (c, d) =
αP1 u1(c) +α
P
2 u2(c) +α
P
3 u3(c) +α
P
4 u4(c) +α
P
5 u5(c) = 14,
FpiWS ,P (d, c) = 12 so that c piWS ,P d.
(13) DA:Assert(φ
(4)
1 ), φ
(4)
1 = {[c  d]}
(14) DM:Accept(φ
(4)
8 ), φ
(4)
8 = {[c  d}): CS(4)(dm) =
CS(2)(dm) ∪ {[c  d]}
5rd iteration – update: KB(5)P = KB(4)P ; KB(5)φ = {[b 
c], [c  d]}, pi[KB(5)P ] = piWS, φ(5)c = [a  b  c  d],
miss(φ
(5)
c ) = {[a  b]}
(15) DA:Question(φ
(5)
2 ), φ
(5)
2 = {[a  b]}
(16) DM:Accept(φ
(5)
8 ), φ
(5)
8 = {[a  b]}, CS(5)(dm) =
CS(4)(dm) ∪ {[a  b]}
6rd iteration – update: KB(6)P = KB(4)P ; KB(6)φ = {[a 
b  c  d]}, pi[KB(6)P ] = piWS, φ(6)c = {[a  b  c  d]},
miss(φ
(6)
c ) = ∅
(17) DA:Success(φ
(6)
0 ), φ
(6)
0 = {[a  b  c  d]}
In this example, we start with model piSM at the first
iteration. Then model piSWM is used at the second iteration
due to statements [c1 = strong ], [c2 = strong ]. Lastly at
iteration 4, piWS is used due to statements [c3 : d = bad], [c4 :
d = bad], [c5 : d = bad]. The inference of the comparison
among options is consistently constructed even though the
model is changing, thanks to the relation between the models
and the related properties.
5. TERMINATION OF THE DIALOGUE
At each new iteration of the dialogue, there are two pos-
sible end states: success (acceptance by the DM of a rec-
ommendation), or a failure (the DA is not able to find a
proposal with an explanation that convinces the DM).
Proposition 1. Under UN, the length of the dialogue
resulting from the protocol is at most:
7 |P |+ 2 |O| (|O| − 1) + 1
where P is the knowledge base of the DM.
The size of P depends on the number of criteria. One can
easily derive bounds of |P | from the type of models that the
DM is expected to follow.
Corollary 1. Under UN, the protocol terminates.
Termination requires very few assumptions. However, as we
shall see now, obtaining guarantees on the quality of the
outcome is much more demanding.
6. OUTCOMES OF THE DIALOGUE
The DA is deemed to be an automatic agent following
some rationality postulates (e.g. axiom UN). On the other
hand, the DM is an individual and has more freedom of
action in the dialogue. However, we show in this section that
if the DM is representable by a model contained in the set Π
of models, then the dialogue necessarily terminates with a
Succeed, the option that results from the dialogue is among
the best options for the DM, and the properties that the DA
guesses are correct (but the DA may not have guessed all
properties – this depends on the length of the dialogue). In
particular, if the dialogue ends with a failure, this means
that the DM is not representable by a model in Π. In order
account for this, we should make some assumptions of the
consistency of both the DA and DM: in particular, the DM
must accept a statement if he agrees with the explanation
provided by the DA.
We first strengthen the constraint of the explanation given
by the DA, following a data-based explanation approach [9].
Axiom 3 (Explanation in Argue (EA)). Consider an
agent (DA or DM) having preferences P and using model pi.
For the agent to utter Argue([x  y], p), p is the set of
all statements of the form [x c y], [y c x], [c = wc],
[c : x = α] and [c : y = α] belonging to P .
For the agent to utter Argue(φ, p), p is the union of all p
statements appearing in Argue([x  y], p), for all elements
[x  y] of φ. In particular, p |=pi φ.
We consider the case where DM is represented by pref-
erence information P and user model pi := pi[P ] (Def. 11).
In our running example, we have P contains all statements
of the form [x ci y], plus [c1 = strong ], [c2 = strong ] and
[c4 : d = bad]. Moreover, pi = piWS .
We can illustrate axiom EA from Ex. 12. At turn (3), the
DA argues {[b  a]}, by the explanation {[b c3 a], [b c4
a], [b c5 a]}. The explanation indeed contains all state-
ments in KB(1)P that are related to the comparison [b 
a]. The same holds for the other speech acts Argue used
throughout the dialogue (see turns (6), (12)).
Axiom 4 (Consistency for the DM (C)). We assume
that P is consistent. If the DA utters Argue(φ5, p5) in the
protocol, then the next speech act is:
(α) The DM utters Contradict(φ4) iff there exists φ
′
4 s.t.
φ4 ⊆ φ5, P |=pi φ′4 and φ4 is conflicting with φ′4;
(β) The DM utters Accept(φ8) iff φ8 ⊆ φ5, P |=pi φ5 and
p5 |=pi φ5 (the DM would obtain the same conclusion
with his preferences and also the same explanation).
(γ) Otherwise, the next move of the DM is Argue(φ7, p7),
where φ7 ⊆ φ5, p7 ⊆ P , p7 |=pi φ7 and p7 6⊆ p5 (the
DM agrees on φ7 but provides a more specific explana-
tion).
Example 13. In Turns (4), the DM asserts a statement
that is exactly the opposite to the statement argued just before
by the DA, which fulfills axiom C.
Lemma 3. Let pi ∈ Π and P ∈ P(pi). If Argue(φ, p) is
used (with p ⊆ P ), then for every p′ ⊇ p with p′ ⊆ P , p′
consistent and p′ ∈ P(pi), then p′ |=pi φ.
Lemma 4. Let P ⊆ P. Q(P ) = {R ⊇ Qpi[P ] , R ∈ Q}.
Proposition 2. Assume that RAM, EA, UN and C
are satisfied. Let R = Qpi. Assume that the knowledge base
of the DA at the start of the dialogue is included in P . Then:
• The dialogue terminates with Success;
• The dialogue stops with properties R ∈ Q, and R ⊆ R
(the properties guessed by the DA are correct);
• at the end, the recommendation provided by the DA is
%pi,P , and the DM agrees with it.
Proof. In an iteration of the protocol, the knowledge
bases are KBP and KBφ. Axiom UN determines the model
and thus the properties R corresponding to the preference
information KBP collected so far by the DA: R is the small-
est element of Q(KBP ) (w.r.t. ⊆). Let pi be the model
associated to R (i.e. with Qpi = R). Hence pi = pi[KBP ]
and R = Qpi[KBP ]. By the statement of the proposition,
R is the smallest element of Q(P ) w.r.t. ⊆. By definition
of KBP , we have KBP ⊆ P . Clearly, by RAM, we have
Q(KBP ) ⊇ Q(P ) and thus R ∈ Q(KBP ) (as R ∈ Q(P )).
By Lemma 4, we have Q(KBP ) = {R′ ⊇ R , R′ ∈ Q}.
Hence property R ∈ Q(KBP ) implies that R ⊆ R.
Assume by contradiction that the dialogue ends by Fail.
By UN, a Fail is obtained only when the last move of the
DM is a Argue(φ7, p7). This speech act was a respond to
statement φ (in Argue(φ1), Question(φ2) or Argue(φ5, p5)),
by the DA. We assume that φ is supported by p, with
p ⊆ KBP , i.e. p |=pi φ by Axiom EA. There are two cases:
Case 1: p7 ⊆ KBP – case UN-(a): the DM did not pro-
vide any new preference information. As the DM argued, he
did not agree with Argue(φ, p) made by the DA.
In the case UN-(a), we have CS(dm) ⊆ KBP ∪ KBφ ∪
CS(da). This implies that the DM arrives at the same con-
clusions as the DA.
We conclude that φ and φ7 cannot be conflicting (see Def.
7).
The DM could not have used speech Contradict(φ4) since
then φ4 (which contradicts a statement commited by the
DA) would belong to CS(dm), and thus CS(dm) 6⊆ KBP ∪
KBφ ∪ CS(da), which contradicts UN-(a).
Hence in the last iteration of the dialogue, there is nec-
essarily the speech act Argue(φ5, p5) by the DA, and then
later the speech act Argue(φ7, p7) by the DM, with φ7 ⊆ φ5.
As the DM didn’t contradict Argue(φ5, p5) (by the DA),
the DM agrees with φ5 (see C-α). Hence P |=pi φ5. Now, as
the DM didn’t accept Argue(φ5, p5) (by the DA), we have
p5 6|=pi φ5.
Furthermore, as the DM made speech act Argue(φ7, p7),
we have φ7 ⊆ φ5, p7 ⊆ P , p7 |=pi φ7 and p7 6⊆ p5. Then, p7 ⊆
KBP as p7 ⊆ CS(dm) and CS(dm) ⊆ KBP ∪KBφ∪CS(da).
To sum-up, we have
p5 |=pi φ5 , p5 6|=pi φ5 , P |=pi φ5,
p7 |=pi φ7 , φ7 ⊆ φ5,
p7 6⊆ p5 , p7 ⊆ KBP , p5, p7 ∈ P(pi)
From EA, p5 (resp. p7) contains all statements in KBP
related to φ5 (resp. φ7). As φ7 ⊆ φ5, it is not possible
p7 6⊆ p5. Hence a contradiction is raised.
Case 2: KBP is inconsistent (after p7 has been added to
KBP ) – case UN-(b). This is not possible as KBP contains
only the preference information provided by the DM (i.e.
KBP ⊆ P ), and the preference information P is consistent
and thus any subset is also consistent. Hence the dialogue
cannot end by Fail.
As the dialogue terminates (see Proposition 1), it neces-
sarily terminated by a Success. By UN, a Success occurs
when the DM has accepted (in one or several times) the rec-
ommendation of the DA for goal G that the DA can derive
from KBP and pi. By C-(β), the DM accepts a statement
only if it is entailed by his preferences. Hence the DM agrees
with the recommendation of the DA for goal G and it is nec-
essarily the final recommendation.
This is our main result: it shows for instance that if the
protocol returns a single recommended option, then this op-
tion is indeed amongst the DM’s most preferred options.
7. RELATEDWORK AND CONCLUSION
Recommender systems have developed very sophisticated
techniques and algorithms, with the DM feedback being as
a vital component allowing to produce better recommenda-
tions. However, the case of multi-criteria recommendation
remains challenging: it was identified as an emerging topic
in the survey of [1] and is still recognized as such in the Rec-
ommender Systems Handbook [21]. A problem arising in
this context is that it opens a wide range of possible models
to account for the DM’s preferences [6]. And in that case,
the feedback of the DM may reveal preferential information
that require more than a simple adjustment of a parameter
in a predefined model. For instance in [20], a weighted sum
model is used. For a given criterion, its weight is initialized
by a default value, and is then multiplied by a factor if the
user critiques this criterion (the critique proves the user put
more importance on this criterion). While our approach is
close in spirit, we instead show in this paper how the feed-
back of the DM can be exploited so as to perform adaptive
selection of preference models.
Dialectical models of interaction have gained tremendous
popularity in recent years in the multiagent community.
Many protocols have been put forward, to tackle different
types of interaction [26]. It is clear that these protocols
offer a greater expressivity than simple feedback (since rec-
ommendations can be challenged and justified, as illustrated
here). Recently, an emphasis has been put on proving prop-
erties of such dialectical models, see e.g. [3, 10]. Our paper
follows this trend of research and studies a type of interac-
tion whose specificities have seldom been studied. Indeed,
while the link between decision-making and argumentation
has been investigated over a number of years [2, 8, 11, 15,
23], the decision-aiding setting itself has been little studied,
and the little reported work [16] does not go as far as we
do in capturing the process of exploring possible decision
models.
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